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Abstract: Zambia, situated in the Southern African region, has a population of 13 million and GDP in 2009 was estimated at 
ZMK61.1 trillion or approximately USD12.8 billion. Economic composition of GDP by sector is 40.2% services, 38.2% industry 
and 21.6% agriculture. GDP growth averaged 4.8% in the decade between 1999 and 2009, with strong performance in the 
construction, mining and agricultural sectors. However, as a services-based economy, growth is constrained by, inter alia, slow 
emergence of a competitive telecommunications sector that can provide the platform for the national and international flow of 
information and communication required for further rapid advances in economic development. This article reviews the state of 
competition in Zambia’s telecommunications sector, with due attention to the fixed line and international gateway, the mobile 
telephony and Internet markets.
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INTRODUCTION 
The Zambian telecommunications sector has been subjected to competition since 1997 when 
the first privately owned mobile cellular enterprise entered the market. This was Telecel 
Zambia, taken over in 2006 by MTN. The entry followed economic reforms commenced in 1991, 
the first since the notable “Mulungushi Reforms” of 1968 on the nationalisation of industry. 
While liberalisation was embraced, influential government officials prevailed over the state to 
retain 100% ownership of the state-owned Zambia Telecommunications Company Limited 
(Zamtel) for almost 15 years after the beginning of the privatisation process. Zamtel was 
hardly a cash cow – its survival was based on a small number of fixed landlines and a 
vociferously protected international gateway monopoly. The greatest customer for Zamtel was 
government, which was also its largest debtor.
Zambia’s liberalisation of the economy from 1991 spelt trouble for Zamtel, not because it was 
facing competition per se, but because its operations were dogged  by old technology, lack of 
recapitalisation and a larger workforce than the leaner private sector entrants, which would 
include Zamcell, later renamed Celtel, then Zain, now Airtel.
As with many public enterprises that exhibit sentimental rather than economic value, local 
interest in the telecommunications sector in Zambia concerned the wealth and health of Zamtel, 
just as at a certain time, discussing Zambia’s public transport system was not possible without 
mentioning the United Bus Company of Zambia (UBZ), despite its chronic financial woes, 
1  This article builds on previous articles  prepared by the author in collaboration with the then Communications Authority of Zambia 
(now Zambia Information & Communication Technologies Authority – ZICTA) in 2008, as well as a paper that was presented to the Multi-Year 
Expert Meeting on Services, Development and Trade of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Geneva, 17- 19 March 2009.
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notoriety for lack of time-keeping or “no-shows”, and accidents on inter-town routes. Similarly, 
discussing the privatisation or breaking the monopoly of companies such as Zamtel was an 
emotional socio-political issue with public outcry over what would happen to the country if such 
a “big” company was sold, especially to foreign owners. Calls for protecting Zamtel from 
competition were based on the fear that Zamtel was “not ready for competition”. There is, 
however, little doubt that the development of the telecommunications sector in Zambia has been 
driven by a degree of competition, which has resulted in greater benefits for the consumer, 
particularly with respect to the Internet and mobile telephony.
The benefits of liberalisation to Zambian society have been immense, compared with the limited 
value offered by the closed fixed-line and international gateway markets. Thus, despite public 
sentiment, the Government of Zambia took a bold decision to dispose of 70% of Zamtel equity 
to LAP Green of Libya in the first quarter of 2010. The Government simultaneously and 
effectively removed the Zamtel monopoly over the international gateway. While the fixed-line 
market has offered little attraction for private sector participation, the liberalisation of the 
international gateway and the reduction of licence fees to USD350 000 immediately attracted 
new entry. With such entry, the Zambian public had a  very rare treat when they saw reductions 
in international calling rates by as much as 70% (Zambian Economist, 2010; Lusaka Times, 
2010). This perhaps is thought-provoking empirical evidence that policy makers, regulators and 
the opinion leaders may need to count the cost to consumer welfare arising from any protectionist 
tendencies in the ICT sector.
This article looks at the state of competition in Zambia’s telecommunications sector. The article 
provides an overview of the relevant telecoms and competition legislation; looks into various 
sub-sectors of the broader telecoms sector and reviews the state of competition in these sub-
sectors. It argues that (a) while competition in telecommunications markets is generally regarded 
as necessary for social welfare, the Zambian landscape has been slow to adapt to competition, 
and (b) now that an agenda for change is being more clearly articulated in policy and legislation, 
regulators should more actively pursue the objective of promoting competition in the fixed line, 
international gateway, mobile telephony and Internet markets.
A PERSPECTIVE ON COMPETITION IN TELECOMMUNICATIONS 
MARKETS
A careful analysis of the variables that affect competition in a multi-billion dollar sector is a 
process that any country should take seriously. A proper analysis of what makes markets work 
and how the various factors of competition affect market development is an important aspect 
that should be fostered in any study of the telecommunications market in Zambia. This process 
goes beyond price regulation and promoting competition through licensing. A number of 
studies, including the report on the Status of Competition in Canadian Telecommunications 
Markets (CRTC, 2004) have acknowledged that assessing the state of competition in a market 
is not a simple matter. Collection of information related to telecommunications markets, 
including market size and market share, is a first step in order to monitor the status of 
competition.
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Factors that determine the study or analysis of competition include the market definition, 
market concentration ratios, barriers to entry, substitutability, countervailing power and 
dominance, ie determination of market power and/or significant market power. This 
approach is also used in the European Union as adopted in the Commission guidelines 
on market analysis and the assessment of significant market power under the 
Community regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and 
services (EU, 2002).
The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) has noted that “the 
telecommunications industry has been transformed by increasingly vigorous competition in an 
environment of rapid change” (OECD, 2001, 1). As new technologies emerge and markets 
expand, firms need to connect to each other’s networks. Hence, the OECD (2001, 1) argues that 
“the most complex questions facing regulators … are frequently focused on the conditions of 
access of one network to another’s network”. Opportunities for competition in underdeveloped 
markets depends on the demand for new services, the economies of scale and scope that emerge 
over time and the technological innovations introduced. In order to grow a particular market for 
telecommunications services, governments may require mandatory access and interconnection 
arrangements, but may use different approaches to set the “financial terms of access” (ibid.). 
Access prices should reflect the underlying mechanisms that might be used to recover fixed 
costs, in other words access prices should be cost-based (Mason & Valletti, 2001). These are key 
issues for regulators.
MARKET POWER AND DOMINANCE
OECD (2002) offers reasons for regulation, as do Bar & Borrus (1997), including promotion of 
universal access to telecommunications services and fostering competitive markets for 
telecommunications services in order to ensure good quality of service, advanced services and 
efficient prices. Key matters for the attention of regulators include preventing abuses of market 
power and other forms of anti-competitive behaviour by dominant firms, creating the 
environment for network investment and protecting consumer rights.
With respect to transport infrastructure, though the principles would apply equally to 
telecommunications infrastructure, the UN (2001, 180) argues that the concerns of competition 
authorities and infrastructure regulators with respect to promoting competitive markets are focused 
on established operators that have market power. Firms without market power are simply not able 
to cause serious problems in the economy or in the sector. If they raise their prices above market 
levels, for example, they will simply lose customers and profits. In general, market power is defined 
as “the ability of a firm to raise prices above competitive levels, without promptly losing a substantial 
portion of its business to … rivals …” (Infodev, nd, 24). This practice can occur to such a degree as 
to make market participation unprofitable for other parties or new entrants. Factors frequently 
considered in determining whether a firm has market power include vertical integration, barriers to 
market entry, market share, pricing behaviour, profitability (Intven, 2000, 5-11; 5-12). In particular, 
effective access to advanced telecommunications can only be possible with the removal of barriers 
to entry, including lowering the costs of entry, thus potentially leading to the maximisation of social 
welfare (Carlton & Perloff, 2005; Blees, Kemp, Maas & Mosselman, 2003). 
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Where there are barriers to entry, their importance depends on the circumstances. They 
are likely to be less important when there are multiple incumbents with varying 
characteristics and interests, when technological change is rapid and when potential 
entrants are established firms with a presence in related markets. To the extent that 
incumbent firms are able to take advantage of the existence of barriers to entry to engage 
in exclusionary behaviour, remedies may be sought under the Competition and Fair Trading 
Act 18 of 1994 (Cap 417) of the laws of Zambia.
A firm controlling essential telecommunication services can exhibit certain dominance traits in 
the market, more so when it owns the international gateway system, as Zamtel did. The refusal 
to supply scarce facilities or resources required by a competitor is an anti-competitive act. More 
so, it is an abuse of dominance where the dominant firm, by virtue of controlling an upstream 
essential facility such as the telecommunications backbone, may be able to push up the price 
of a scarce input to the point where entry in the downstream market is unprofitable. The 
Canadian Competition Bureau (2001) argues that such approaches “may be profitable to the 
dominant firm(s), despite the higher price it also pays for the input, because it avoids the 
dissipation of profits that (any new) entry would bring”.
Refusal to deal with a prospective entrant in signing interconnection agreements and/or 
co-location of equipment necessary to enter and grow in the industry at lesser cost is an instance 
of abuse that may also need to be checked in the Zambian telecommunications market. “Simply 
making competition possible by the existence of rights to resale or to build and operate facilities 
is not enough…” (Bar & Borrus, 1997).
RESPONSES TO MARKET DOMINANCE
While there are many possible responses to market dominance, regulators need to carefully 
select among the range of mechanisms that may or may not revolutionise the 
telecommunications industry and aid in the reduction of high market concentrations and 
abuse of dominance. In the absence of effective substitutability, owing largely to behavioral 
rather than structural impediments, there would be little if any effective competition in the 
mobile telephony subsector in particular. 
LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR COMPETITION IN ZAMBIA
The Competition and Fair Trading Act, No 18 of 1994 (Cap 417), was the first legislation in 
Zambia that defined dominance and highlighted certain conduct in which a dominant firm, 
so identified, could not engage. Under Section 2 of Cap 417, “monopoly” was defined in the 
context of “dominance”, as follows:
A dominant undertaking or an undertaking which together with not more than two independent 
undertakings –
a) produces, supplies, distributes or otherwise controls not less than one half of the total 
goods of any description that are produced, supplied or distributed throughout Zambia or any 
substantial part of Zambia; or
b) provides or otherwise controls not less than one-half of the services that are rendered in 
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Zambia or any substantial part thereof (Government of Zambia, 1994).
From the above definition, the elements could be dissected to enable us to understand a 
monopoly undertaking as:
(i)    a dominant firm, which has at least 50% market share in Zambia or a substantial part of 
it (ie unilateral market power);
(ii)    an undertaking which, with not more than two independent undertakings, has a combined 
market share of at least 50% (ie combined market power as in the case of collusion).
Dominance or monopoly power may be exercised by a single firm or two or more independent 
firms acting in concert by colluding to have similar or complementary marketing strategies. Any 
firm acting singularly with at least 50% market share is deemed to be a monopoly and/or a 
dominant firm. Equally, dominance and/or monopoly standing would be inferred where firms 
agree to have the same market price, same distribution channels, packaging, etc to the exclusion 
of other firms. These combined practices are commonly referred to as “cartels”, “horizontal 
restraints” or “horizontal arrangements” and are prohibited under Section 9 of Cap 417.
There are generally two tests in the determination of dominance. The first is a quantitative test, 
which is a per se determination based on the market share of a firm. For instance, Cap 417 in 
Zambia defined the structural test with a 50% threshold. In a relatively concentrated market, a 
40% market share could be considered to be a dominant market share in effect. This is because 
the conduct of the firm may indicate that it does actually exercise characteristics of a dominant 
firm regardless of its market share. There is always a dispute on market shares and their 
computations, consequently competition law jurisprudence has tended to focus on the behavioral 
test, which is a rule of reason determination based on the actual behaviour of a firm in a defined 
product market. Thus a firm may argue that its market share does not give it the necessary 
market power to act independently of other market actors. The rule of reason thus allows the 
determination by a competition authority to go a step further and consider each case on its own 
merits. Section 2 of the Competition and Consumer Protection Act No. 24 of 2010 (Government 
of Zambia, 2010) has since clarified this through defining “dominant position” as a situation 
where an enterprise or a group of enterprises possesses such economic strength in a market 
as to make it possible for it to operate in that market, and to adjust prices or output, without 
effective constraint from competitors or potential competitors. Section 15 further adds a second 
test where there is a presumption of dominance at 30% market share.
The practice of competition law has emphasised the need to decipher instances of abuse or 
misuse of market power, as opposed to mere dominance. Section 7(2) of the Competition and 
Fair Trading Act required2  enterprises to refrain from specific acts of anti-competitive 
behaviour, including predatory behaviour, discriminatory pricing and discrimination in terms 
and conditions, bundling goods and services and collusion. 
2                    All the terms used in this section except for “dominance” are not defined in the Act. A useful guide for definitions is the Glossary 
of terms used in EU Competition Policy – Antitrust and control of concentrations.  
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THE ZAMBIAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS MARKETS
Few studies on the telecommunications sector in Zambia have reviewed the state of competition. 
Generally, there are four principal markets, being the landline (fixed/terrestrial) and the international 
gateway markets and the mobile telephony and Internet markets. Telephone ownership was restricted 
to 0.3% of rural households, while only 8% of rural households had access to a public phone within a 
walking distance of five kilometres, compared with 95% for urban households. Virtual monopoly 
service provision in multiple service markets severely limited the access expansion rate for most of 
the decade from 2000 (World Bank, 2006).
Zambia has a population of 12.9 million and GDP is estimated at K61 trillion or roughly USD12.8 
billion (AfDB, 2010a, 388-389). In the decade 1999 to 2009, it has shown consistent growth at an 
average 4.8% per annum (AfDB, 2010b). The geographic telecommunications market covers the 
areas where there is a concentration of the population and business, being principally the areas along 
the railway line joining the Copperbelt in the north through Lusaka in the central region to Livingstone 
in the south. There is also the emerging “New Copperbelt” area around Solwezi in the North West 
Province.
Despite promising penetration growth rates, Zambia is still behind regional standards with regard 
to providing access to telecommunication services for its citizens. The sector is characterised by 
limited access to infrastructure services, with only three lines per 100 people and stagnating fixed-
line penetration rates.
It is evident that Zain dominates the mobile telephony market in Zambia and under the competition 
law, is actually legally enjoying a monopoly position. On the other hand, Zamtel enjoys absolute 
monopoly in the fixed landline segment of the market and, until recently, in the international gateway 
market. There used to be arguable concerns that the structural advantage of Zamtel was a source of 
market power, which was then used to deny equitable access to certain backbone infrastructure in 
telecommunications. Zamtel no longer exercises any such dominance, since the entry of Zain/Airtel. 
In addition, the lack of interconnection regulations for some time in the sector has also led to instances 
of abuse by dominant operators in the sector, where they have used this to frustrate the completion 
of calls emanating from other networks. This has however been rectified through the passing of 
interconnection guidelines under the ICT Act of 2009. ZICTA commissioned Price Waterhouse 
Coopers (PWC) UK to carry out an ICT Cost of Service Study in 2009. Following this, ZICTA issued 
guidelines following sections 41 (5), 47 (2), 48(3) and 50 of the ICT Act (Chalwe, 2010).
THE FIXED LANDLINE MARKET
By 2000, household fixed-line penetration was approximately 5.6%, while “the average annual 
growth rate in teledensity of 3.7% … barely kept up with the population growth rate of 3%” (Kakubo, 
2000). IP telephony was not allowed in Zambia and international voice telephony was the monopoly 
of the PSTN operator until mid-2010. Tele-density in Zambia, similar to other countries, is higher 
than average in urban areas. In four major cities, tele-density reaches 2.01 per 100 persons, though 
average teledensity has not increased significantly since 2007, with estimates of 0.77 fixed-line 
subcribers per 100 inhabitants and 22.6 mobile subscribers per 100 inhabitants (AfDB, 2010b).
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The fixed landline market (PSTN) was a privileged monopoly of the state-owned Zambia 
Telecommunications Company (Zamtel) Limited. The evident lack of a proactive competition 
policy in this market until 2009/10 was a historical phenomenon and had a cost-based rationale. 
Historically, the state-owned Post and Telecommunications Corporation (PTC) Limited was the 
sole supplier of telecommunications services in Zambia. With 100% funding from the State 
Treasury, PTC put up the key backbone infrastructure in the industry. The PSTN infrastructure 
has suffered from systematic vandalism, a lack of recapitalisation and a lack of productive and 
allocative efficiencies, while mobile telephony has become an effective substitute. In Zambia, the 
installation costs for fixed telephony are relatively low, more so with the introduction of the 
prepaid TelZ fixed landline service. However, the historical lack of a focused market development 
strategy has seen this market grow more slowly than the mobile telephony segment.
THE INTERNATIONAL GATEWAY MARKET
The international gateway market in Zambia was opened to competition in 2010, when the 
government reduced the licence fee from the previous USD18 million to USD350 000. Within a 
week of the reduction, private firms MTN and Zain, entered the market and announced a 
reduction of international call rates by as much as 70%. As noted by the Zambia Competition 
Commission (2008), lack of private sector entry led to very high international call tariffs, as well 
as lack of investment in modern and more efficient technology in the international gateway 
system.
THE MOBILE CELLULAR MARKET
The mobile telephony market has grown tremendously in Zambia and in Africa generally. Mobile 
telephony is the fastest growing segment of the telecommunications sector. As Graph 1 shows, 
the mobile market has outgrown the fixed-line market in Africa, from about four million 
subscribers in 1999 to 65 million subscribers in 2005, while fixed-line growth moved from 19 
million to 30 million subscribers over the same period (ITU, 2008).
            
GRAPH 1: AFRICAN TELECOMS SUBSCRIBER GROWTH                                 
   Source: International Telecommunication Union (ITU), April 2008.
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Mobile telephony appears to have grown at the expense of the fixed line because of the relatively 
easier set-up process, as well as the convenience of using a mobile phone. There are also 
numerous technological advantages to mobile telephony – a mobile phone offers a personal 
directory of contact details, the short messaging service, mobile Internet and even access to 
mobile payment systems.
The Zambian mobile market has witnessed competition since the 1999 entry of Zamcell, 
renamed Celtel, then Zain (and renamed Airtel). Zain was the largest mobile operator in 
Zambia and had more than two million customers as at 30 June 2008, providing coverage to 
71% of the population and offering a range of voice services, international roaming, pre- and 
post-paid subscriptions, SMS and mobile Internet to individual, corporate and SME customers 
(Zain, n.d.). The following figures give a snapshot of mobile market shares as at 2008:
TABLE 1: ZAMBIA MOBILE MARKET SHARES
Service provider Subscribers as at 31.12.07 Market share Subscribers as at 30.06.08 Market share
Zain 1 956 976 78.9% 2 040 014 76.1%
MTN 262 186 10.6% 452 799 16.8%
CellZ 261 225 10.5% 190 069 7.1%
Totals 2 480 389 100% 2 688 882 100%
Source: Communications Authority Zambia (CAZ), April 2008
Zain had registered phenomenal growth, having entered the market in 1999 after CellZ (the 
Zamtel Cellular) and MTN (then Telecel). An aggressive entry marketing strategy at the time 
when GSM was introduced, assisted by a less capitalised Zamtel Cellular and MTN, would 
appear to have jolted Zain to an unprecedented market growth from 0% at point of entry to 76% 
10 years later.
THE INTERNET MARKET
The Internet has been described as one of the most influential technologies of the century. This 
is because it has completely redefined the concepts of communication and information exchange. 
Zambia first became connected to the Internet in 1994 through a slow leased line to South Africa 
with about 250 users, many of whom were academics and medical staff. Over the past 10 years, 
the Internet has changed dramatically and has become an exceedingly influential and 
indispensable tool to businesses and individuals alike. The three main challenges related to the 
growth of the Internet in Zambia have been identified to be insufficient or less developed 
communication infrastructure, high cost of delivering Internet bandwidth and high cost of 
computers and related communication accessories, though import duty has been lowered.
By 2008, Zambia had seven licensed Internet Service Providers (ISPs) and the market has 
generally been open to new entrants due to the large untapped and perhaps yet to be Internet-
enlightened market. Out of the seven, one is owned by the recently privatised Zamtel, while the 
others are privately owned. Statistics show that few Zambians are accessing the Internet 
through a broadband connection:
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TABLE 2: INTERNET MARKET SHARES AS AT 30 JUNE 2008
                  ISP Subscribers Subtotal Market share
Dial up Broadband
Africonnect 0 1 600 1 600 9.6%
Zamnet 4 540 1 222 5 762 34.6%
Zamtel 6 415 157 6 572 39.5%
CopperNet 655 586 1 241 7.5%
UUNET 372 118 490 2.9%
Microlink 310 502 812 4.9%
Real Time 0 150 150 1%
Total 12 292 4 335 16  627 100%
   Source: Communications Authority of Zambia (CAZ), 2008
The majority of Internet subscribers have generally been institutional subscribers, while the 
market is yet to capture the individual household on a mass scale. Compared with countries in 
the region, Zambia’s Internet usage is low, with approximately 816 000 subscribers out of a 
population of nearly 13 million in 2010, while Zimbabwe had 1.4 million Internet users in 2010 
or 11.4 users per 100 inhabitants (ITU, 2010, 106).
MARKET CONCENTRATION
MARKET CONCENTRATION IN FIXED LINES
The fixed-line operator has enjoyed a monopoly position with no competition restraints of any 
sort. The development of this part of the telecommunications sector has remained unexplored 
by the private sector. The market concentration is 100% monopoly, with an Herfindahl-Hirschman 
Index (HHI) of 10 000.
MARKET CONCENTRATION IN THE INTERNATIONAL GATEWAY
Since June 2010, the gateway has been effectively liberalised, but new market shares are yet 
to be compiled. If the mobile telephony market shares are to be used as a measure, then the 
market share for international calls may be in favour of Zain/Airtel – more so when roaming 
is factored into the profile. Zain/Airtel has a wider roaming network than MTN and CellZ. 
However, if we take the traditional view, the fixed landline has ordinarily been the business 
line, as well as the line for international calls. The mobile telephony providers have reduced 
their international call rates by as much as 70%, which, depending on market response and 
use, may become as inexpensive as the fixed land line.
MARKET CONCENTRATION IN MOBILE TELEPHONY
There appears to be high market concentration in all countries in the mobile telephony market. 
As noted in the table below, Canada’s national HHI for mobile wireless telecommunications 
services in a market with three carriers is lower than the HHIs of some countries with four 
carriers, and is almost identical to the Netherlands, which has five. The HHI can also be 
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expressed as a fraction and inverted to yield what is known as a numbers equivalent. This is 
the number of equal-sized competitors that would yield the observed HHI. Canada is closely 
bunched with a large number of countries with a numbers equivalent around three. Hong 
Kong, the US and the UK are much less concentrated, while Norway, New Zealand and 
Switzerland are much more concentrated. In many markets, the fourth and sometimes even 
the third carrier have relatively small market shares and are thus regarded as minor 
competitive forces (McFetridge, 2008).
TABLE 3: CONCENTRATION OF DEVELOPED COUNTRY MOBILE WIRELESS MARKETS
Country Number of carriers 2 - Firm concentration
ratio (CR)
HHI Numbers equivalent
Norway 2.0 100.0 5 508 1.8
New Zealand 2.0 100.0 5 016 2.0
Switzerland 3.0 81.8 4 627 2.2
Belgium 3.0 77.0 3 65 2.7
Canada 3.0 68.9 3 400 2.9
Netherlands 5.0 73.4 3 396 2.9
Singapore 3.0 71.8 3 372 3.0
UK 5.0 49.1 2 257 4.4
US 4.0 51.5 2 016 5.0
Hong Kong 5.0 44.6 1 606 6.2
    Source: Merrill Lynch Global Wireless Matrix 3Q, 2008
For the Zambian concentrations, the HHI for Zain of 5 791in June 2008 showed a fairly 
monopolised market, with the other incumbents offering more “niche” than mainstream 
competition, although for strict application of HHI, it falls short of the 10 000 index 
required for a monopoly existence.
TABLE 4: MOBILE MARKET CONCENTRATION (HHI CALCULATIONS)
    Service provider Market share
(31.12.07)
Herfindahl Hirschman  
Index (HHI)
Market share
(30.06.08)
Herfindahl Hirschman 
Index (HHI)
Zain 78.9% 6 225.21 76.1% 5 791.21
MTN 10.6% 112.36 16.8% 282.24
CellZ 10.5% 110.25 7.1% 50.41
Totals 100% 6 447.82 100% 6 123.86
   Source: As compiled by author based on data from Communications Authority Zambia (CAZ) 
With an HHI level of over 6 000, of which the largest proportion is attributed to one 
player, the market does not enjoy significant competition, as there is a dominant 
market player who acts as a guide to other players in terms of price and product 
offers.
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In this view, the three-firm market concentration ratio shows a concentration of 100%, 
which was an indication of a highly concentrated market with little if any effective competition 
to Zain/Airtel. Celtel, the forerunner to Zain, had grown to be the dominant firm in the sector, 
and with the change-over to Zain enjoyed a decisive market control of 76% by 2008. This, 
however, has been changing since June 2010 when the interconnection regulations became 
effective. The mobile cellular market, which started off as a monopoly and then became a 
duopoly, is theoretically an oligopoly, but from a competition point of view, it is characterised 
by monopolistic competition.
MARKET CONCENTRATION IN INTERNET
The Internet market has been relatively competitive compared to other segments of the 
telecommunications sectors, as shown in Table 5:
TABLE 5: INTERNET MARKET CONCENTRATION 
Internet service provider (ISP) Market share Herfindahl Hirschman Index (HHI)
Zamtel 39.5% 1 560.25
Zamnet 34.6% 1 197.16
Africonnect 9.6% 92.16
CopperNet 7.5% 56.25
Microlink 4.9% 24.01
UUNET 2.9% 8.41
Real Time 1% 1
TOTAL 100% 2 939.24
   
   Source: Communications Authority Zambia (CAZ), 2008
The Internet service market is the most competitive of the four main product markets in the 
telecommunications sector. By 2008, Zamtel controlled almost 40% of the market, while Zamnet 
controlled about 35% of the market. While an HHI of 2 939 shows a market that is highly 
concentrated, this development is still a move in the right direction, noting that in 2002, four 
firms had a market concentration ratio of 100%, while presently the four-firm concentration 
ratio (CR4) is 91.2%. While this is still high, it is a trend that should be fostered, more so with 
the presence of the niche broadband service entrants.
Zamtel has perhaps managed to hold such a high market share due to the integrated nature of 
its fixed landline telephony service provision, combined with the internet subscription. The 
success of Zamnet in the sector shows the first private mover advantage and the brand loyalty 
attached to Zamnet (also applicable to Zamtel). Africonnect, CopperNet and the other ISPs 
appear to be niche players who are trying to break into the mainstream market through offering 
broadband services.
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BARRIERS TO ENTRY IN THE ZAMBIAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS 
MARKET
STRUCTURAL BARRIERS TO ENTRY
Electricity is crucial to sustainable access to telecommunications services. About 39% of 
Zambia’s population resides in urban and peri-urban areas, chiefly in Lusaka and the 
Copperbelt area, while about 49% of the urban population and a meager 3% of the rural 
population have access to electricity (Central Statistical Office, nd). This leads to an overall 
national electrification rate of less than 20% of the country’s roughly two million households 
– mainly in the urban areas. About 61% of Zambia’s population lives in scattered rural areas, 
living on almost a third of the income for urban areas. Furthermore, ICT service providers 
have focused their areas of coverage along the main rail line from Ndola to Lusaka and from 
there on to Livingstone, leaving a large fraction of the population without access to these 
services.
These characteristics of the economy partly explain the urban-rural disparity of ICT penetration 
for the fixed, mobile and Internet sectors. Structural barriers have historically been high in 
fixed telephony, as well as in the international gateway (due to seemingly high opportunity 
costs), where such barriers prevented investment and thus competition was frustrated for 
many years.
ADMINISTRATIVE, LEGAL AND REGULATORY BARRIERS TO ENTRY
The fee structure in the telecommunications sector does not appear to contribute to reduction 
of the sunk costs in the industry. For instance, the requirements, in 2006, by the then 
Communications Authority of Zambia, for the fourth mobile service provider to pay a non-
returnable application form cost of ZMK300 million, approximately USD 63 296, was queried 
by some stakeholders. They questioned whether this figure was intended to limit the number 
of applicants – more so that the public policy objective at the time was to allow Zambian owned 
firms to operate a fourth mobile service provider. 
CREATING A PROGRESSIVE GROWTH PATH FOR THE ICT SECTOR
A number of shifts are observed to have taken place in the telecommunications sector, which 
have helped shift the industry in Zambia in recent years, 2006 to 2010:
(i) The adoption in 2006 of the national ICT Policy, which is pro-competitive, reflects an 
extensive consultative process and provides a basis for revitalising the sector. Zambia’s ICT 
Policy has been developed in close coordination with other sectors and in alignment with other 
national development plans.
(ii) The drafting of legal frameworks, The Information and Communications Technologies 
Act, No. 15 of 2009 (Government of Zambia, 2009a) and The Electronic Communications and 
Transactions Act, No. 21 of 2009 (Government of Zambia, 2009b), which are comprehensive and 
are expected to improve the transparency and predictability of regulatory interventions.
(iii) The decision to liberalise the international gateway by removing prohibitive and 
anticompetitive measures in the international telecommunications segment, in order to allow 
existing service providers to participate and compete alongside Zamtel.
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Historically, free and fair competition has met some form of resistance in the telecommunications 
sector. From a policy point of view, it was viewed with mixed feelings for many years, ranging 
from national security concerns to outright protectionist tendencies, even where the welfare 
losses far outweighed the protectionist gains.
For almost 12 years, there was fragmented regulation of the ICT sector in Zambia, involving the 
Zambia Competition Commission, the Communications Authority of Zambia, and the practically 
“self-regulated” Zamtel. There was a “new deal” in the ICT sector in 2010, following the 
implementation of two complementary policies and promulgation of two complementary laws. 
The national ICT policy and the competition and consumer protection policy have provided a 
detailed policy landscape for the furtherance of the development of ICTs in Zambia. The ICT 
Act has repositioned the former Communications Authority of Zambia to become a more robust 
and dynamic Zambia Information and Communication Technologies Authority (ZICTA), while 
the Competition and Consumer Protection Act has transformed the Zambia Competition 
Commission into the Competition and Consumer Protection Commission.
The national ICT policy envisions Zambia as an “information society”, ie a country where ICT 
has been fully exploited, is part of everyday life and is an enabler of socio-economic development. 
It also proposes that Zambia become a “knowledge based economy”, ie “where ICT is extensively 
used to enhance the knowledge of society in general so that higher human capital brings 
improvement to the economy” (MCT, 2006). The key strategies aimed at achieving these new 
forms of society are evidently to attract new entry and investment in the telecommunications 
sector.
With the privatisation of Zamtel, the State is no longer an active player in the ICT sector. 
However, it is possible that there may be a recurrence of protectionist tendencies through 
lobbying government to promulgate certain regulations, laws and policies that protect incumbent 
players from prospective competition, notably foreign competition. There are conflicting views 
on whether welfare gains may be maximised by limiting the number of entrants in a sector or 
whether welfare gains may equally be maximised through an open competition approach. With 
a history of competition phobia in the Zambian telecommunications sector, it is not surprising 
that there exists a statutory instrument (SI) that appears to be at variance with ICT, investment 
and competition policies. 
Statutory Instrument No 111 of 2009 (SI), issued under the ICT Act of 2009, has “reserved” entry 
into the mobile telephony market in Zambia for a period of five years, effective December 2009. 
With a growing population and labour force, the market for mobile and fixed landlines in Zambia 
is not saturated. The development of any market is evidenced by the entry of new players in a 
particular sector. Investors do not enter into markets they have not studied and where they 
consider their returns would not be achieved. 
The essence of regulation should be to promote business entry, growth and socio-economic 
development by controlling and prohibiting anything that prevents such development. While it 
is necessary to have powers to regulate industry, such powers should not be unfettered and 
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should be amenable to an impartial judicial organ. Regulation should have a two-fold approach 
– regulation through the state and self-regulation. For example, the Competition and Consumer 
Protection Commission (CCPC) and the Zambia Information and Communication Technologies 
Authority (ZICTA) can jointly, or through consultation, develop guidelines for what critical 
information service providers should disclose as part of their customer service . 
Progressively, ZICTA has devised a programme to educate consumers on the latest developments 
in the ICT sector.  It has promulgated guidelines and policies, including how consumers might 
test to verify whether their provider is providing the type of service that it promises to deliver. 
This is commendable. It is trite that regulation should equally ensure that there are incentives 
to measure network performance and monitor whether it matches the promises of broadband 
providers. Given the vigilance of many ICT users, it is likely that complaints will be presented 
to institutions such as CCPC and ZICTA, where performance deviates in practice from what 
was promised, requiring action from regulators.
In looking for a balance between minimising government intervention and ensuring certainty 
and predictability in the application of competitive safeguards, a broad trend toward a converged 
approach to competition policy has emerged. In most countries, principles traditionally 
associated with competition law have been imported into the telecommunications regulatory 
framework. To different degrees, these have included principles of market definition and a 
focus on dominance (ITU, 2002). Telecommunications regulators have often applied broad-
ranging rules or regulations that apply either to the entire industry or to certain categories 
within it. These regulations are typically applied ex-ante and are precise in setting the 
parameters of acceptable market behaviour. They range from explicit retail price control to the 
determination of access terms and conditions. These trends are slowly being understood in 
Zambia. Where there is concurrent jurisdiction, as in the Zambian case, telecommunications 
regulations would have to be realigned with the objective of facilitating competition, and where 
they are not, they have to be amended or removed.
PROMOTING AND ENHANCING CONSUMER WELFARE IN ICTS
All key stakeholder government, quasi-government and non-governmental agencies need to work 
together to ensure effective protection of consumers and facilitate the healthy development of this 
market. Consumers are an effective force in checking any potential abuses of market power by 
service providers.
On the consumer protection front, the reality today is that most consumers are not well informed 
about the state of their telecommunications service and, to the extent that network providers engage 
in any forms of prioritisation (or blocking of particular applications), consumers are generally 
unaware about the existence of such prioritisation. Increasingly, technologies are being developed to 
prioritise different forms of Internet traffic and carriers are likely to adopt such technologies. From 
the consumer perspective, it is critical that they be informed about the relevant offerings and are 
thereby placed in a position to demand particular levels of performance.
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Disclosure is an important aspect of transparent telecommunication services provision. For instance, 
the nature of broadband Internet access is not always clear to consumers and there would 
appear to be a lot of leeway to exploit those consumers. It may be necessary to intensify efforts 
to develop appropriate consumer education and consumer protection enforcement strategies.
Disclosure is about making public information that increases consumer understanding in 
relation to the service being provided and promoting markets in which consumers are aware 
of quality of service issues. Quality of Service (QoS) in both content and context is critical. 
Information on off-peak and peak-time rates, the cost to the consumer to make a mobile phone 
call per second or per minute, may also be critical to enhancing consumer satisfaction.
CONCLUSION
Since the liberalisation policies of the early 1990s, there have been great strides made to 
ensure that the Zambian ICT sector does not lag behind, and in many ways growth has been 
exponential, more so in the mobile telephony and Internet sectors. Where there has been 
reluctance towards competition policy, growth has not been evident, for example in the fixed 
landline market and, prior to 2010, in the international gateway market.
There is greater need now, in this highly dynamic and volatile industry, for competition-friendly 
policies, laws and regulatory approaches. The adoption of national ICT, competition and 
consumer protection policies by the Zambian government in 2006 and 2010 have been major 
milestones that have impacted greatly on the recasting of laws with respect to ICTs, competition 
and consumer protection.
In the context of the Zambian government’s resolve to create jobs and maximise tax income, 
competition can provide a self-regulatory and self-adjusting mechanism to ensure growth 
through introducing new market entrants and innovation by incumbent firms, thus broadening 
the tax base. Government should therefore be wary of a strong lobby from incumbent players 
whose interest is to restrict market entry and entrench their market positions to a level where 
they engage in predatory conduct to frustrate new entrants.
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